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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. Leon Hebert*
In matters affecting professional responsibility, the 19741975 term presented several cases to the Louisiana Supreme
Court that deserve attention. In addition, the several courts
of appeal handed down decisions relating to the necessity of
proving the value of services rendered by attorneys in order
to obtain judgments for their fees.
ADMISSION TO THE BAR
Perhaps the most significant case, In re Dileo,' dealt with
admission to the bar. The fact that the bar examination applicant had been convicted of a felony and had served an
eighteen-month sentence in a federal penitentiary did not
prevent the Louisiana Supreme Court from ordering that he
should be allowed to undergo the examination. The Committee on Admissions had refused his application based on his
lack of moral fitness. The court relied on evidence that rehabilitation had occurred, declaring:
We believe that the conduct of the applicant is not conduct involving such a degree of moral turpitude that it
should forever bar him from the practice of law in this
2
state.
The court then specifically referred to the applicant's need to
show that he "has continued to rehabilitate himself' as a
requirement for admission to the bar.
Not without significance is the court's rejection of the
argument that the transgressions of a non-lawyer, when his
moral fitness is later considered, are analogous to the disciplinary rules and sanctions applicable to licensed attorneys.
This suggests the possibility of rehabilitation as a basis for
readmission to the bar, although the two circumstances
might be distinguished.
In Dileo the court observed that the work of the Committee on Admissions is onerous and involves great responsibility, inferring that its opinions are entitled to great weight,
* Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton
Rouge Bar.
1. 307 So. 2d 362 (La. 1975).
2. Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
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but recognized that the court itself has the final responsibility of reviewing its findings. The burden of establishing good
moral character remains that of the applicant, but it appears
that the court attaches more significance to rehabilitation
accompanied by genuine contrition on the part of the applicant.
A case pending involves an applicant with no felony convictions but three misdemeanor infractions and a "rap sheet"
referring to felony investigations involving the applicant. 3
The commissioner who heard the evidence found that mere
arrest without further proof of complicity with a felony
charge has little evidentiary value. His finding suggested
that the bar work closely with law schools to lessen the possibility that moral character will be questioned for the first
time only after completion of law school. 4
COMMINGLING FUNDS
Disciplinary action sought by the Committee on Professional Responsibility in a commingling case resulted in disbarment of the respondent attorney. 5 The Louisiana Supreme
Court rested its decision squarely on DR 9-102 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, after pointing out that an attorney should avoid even the appearance of impropriety6 and
noting that the respondent had been the subject of earlier
complaints. The court reaffirmed the principle that disbarment is for the protection of the public.
Commingling of funds is probably the most frequent violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is indeed
sad that failure to follow the simple rules of maintaining the
client's funds separately brings about the most severe penalty administered to lawyers-deprivation of the privilege to
practice.
FEES
Before discussing an important case decided by the
Louisiana Supreme Court on the subject of contingent fees, 7
3. In re Stephen Young, Louisiana Supreme Court, No. 55, 704.

4. Id.
5. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Weysham, 307 So. 2d 336 (La. 1975).
6. LA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 9-102 (found in ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, LOUISIANA STATE BAR Ass'N art. XVI; LA. R.S.

37, ch. 4, app.) [hereinafter cited as CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY].
7. Garden Hill Land Corp. v. Succession of Cambre, 306 So. 2d 718 (La.
1975).
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it is appropriate to present some background in connection
with the growing dissatisfaction with that type of contract.
Recognizing the public's concern, and in an attempt to place
reasonable limits on contingent fee contracts, the Appellate
Division, First Department of New York, adopted Rule 4,
placing a limit on such fees in personal injury and death
cases. 8 Basically, the New York court's rule provided a limitation of 50 percent of the first $1,000 of the sum recovered,
40 percent of the next $2,000, 35 percent of the next
$22,000, and 25 percent of any sum over $25,000. Under
extraordinary circumstances it allowed a 33 percent fee. The
rule declared that the retention of a larger fee would constitute "the exaction of unreasonable and unconscionable compensation in violation of Canons 12 and 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics of the New York State Bar Association
unless authorized by a written order of court."9
Rule 4 was upheld in Gair v. Peck.10 The New York court
noted that contingent fee contracts are generally allowed in
the United States as a means of allowing the poor to obtain
competent counsel. It cited the last sentence of the preamble
of Rule 4:
When, however, the contigent fee reaches or approaches
the 50 percent level, it ceases to be a measure of due
compensation for professional services rendered and
makes the lawyer a partner or proprietor in the lawsuit.
This is not a permissible professional relationship or a
proper professional practice."
Declaring Rule 4, which includes reporting procedures, essential to laying a foundation for disciplinary action against attorneys who violate the rule, the court upheld it as a reasonable exercise of court authority.
Though Rule 4 and the Gair case preceded the adoption of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the conclusions
reached there concerning contingent fee arrangements are
expressed in EC 2-17, 2-20 and 2-24.12 More recently the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted a rule regulating contin8. See discussion in Gair v. Peck, 188 N.Y.2d 491,160 N.E.2d 43 (N.Y. App.
1959).
9. The rule is found in id. at 493, 160 N.E.2d at 45.
10. 188 N.Y.2d 491, 160 N.E.2d 43 (N.Y. App. 1959).
11. Id. at 495, 160 N.E.2d at 46.
12. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-17, 2-20, 2-24.
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gent fees. 13 A judicial hearing is provided for lawyers who feel
aggrieved by the rule. The rule was contested by the American Trial Lawyers Association but was found to be constitu14
tional and valid in its entirety.
The Louisiana Supreme Court addressed itself, in Garden
Hill Land Corp. v. Succession of Cambre,15 to the propriety of
50 percent contingent fee contracts in a case in which a
lawyer representing a minor, also a forced heir, intervened in
a partition suit to obtain his fee. Although a court order was
obtained authorizing the tutrix "to enter into a contract with
counsel for the payment of a reasonable fee on a contingency
fee basis, not exceeding one-half of the minor's interest in the
[e]state,"' 6 counsel did not actually obtain a contract until
some nine weeks after the order. Nor was the specific contract
ever approved by the court. Reviewing a decision of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, 17 which had reversed an
award by the district court, Chief Justice Sanders had no
difficulty in finding that valuable legal services had been
performed on behalf of the minor; some 240 hours were
claimed by the lawyer. The court made no definitive award
because the intervenor had not claimed alternatively a fee on
quantum meruit.
The court reiterated its strong duty to protect and
safeguard the interest of minors; however, the real significance of the case is the court's declaration that:
A contract disposing of an entire 50% interest of a
minor's sizable estate, where there is no real risk of nonrecovery (she was a forced heir) would seem on its face to
be unreasonable.' 8
13. N.J. S. CT. R. 1-21:7 (1972) imposes graduated limits on the permissible rate of contingent fees in all tort matters, except business torts and
subrogation matters.
14. American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 316
A.2d 19 (N.J. App. 1974).

15. 306 So. 2d 718 (La. 1975).
16. Id. at 720 (emphasis deleted). The minor's interest in the property
partitioned, ten lots of Woodland Plantation, was 1/12th of $600,240, the
amount 1or which the ten lots were ordered sold.
17. Garden Hill Land Corp. v. Succession of Cambre, 299 So. 2d 403 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1974).
18. Garden Hill Land Corp. v. Succession of Cambre, 306 So. 2d 719, 722
(La. 1975). Language found in Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d 35, 37-39 (D.C. Cir.

1951), extends this thought to all attorney-client relationships: "In a very
real sense attorneys are officers of the courts in which they practice; and
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The opinion left no doubt that some court should pass on the
reasonableness of the fee in view of the size of the estate of
the minor. It remanded the case, suggesting to counsel that
he might amend his pleadings to the alternative relief of
quantum meruit, or even bring his claim in the tutorship
proceedings pending in the district court.
The Louisiana Supreme Court seemingly bent over backwards to suggest relief to the lawyer who represented the
minor and who had spent a great deal of his time in doing so,
but it cast a dark shadow on the reasonableness of a 50
percent contingency fee contract where recovery is certain.
An hourly rate or a fixed fee certainly would have been more
suitable; and, most assuredly, it would have been protected
by the minor's ownership of a sizeable estate.
Coming on the heels of Succession of Butler,19 which disapproved the use of contingent fee contracts in separation
and divorce cases, the GardenHill case should alert the bar to
the rising criticism of contingency fee contracts, especially
those approaching the 50 percent level. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer not to enter into an
agreement for a clearly excessive fee and then offers
guidelines for fee determination. 20 Closer adherence to that
disciplinary rule will improve the image of all lawyers.
PROOF OF VALUE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES

Several cases handed down by the Louisiana courts of
appeal touched on the proof needed to support an award for
an attorney's fees. 2 1 In Masinter v. Grunewald,22 involving a
fee for services rendered in a criminal case allegedly according to a contract, the fourth circuit remanded the suit to
allow proof of the value of services rendered after finding no
specific contract had been entered.
clients are wards of the court in regard to their relationship with their
attorneys .... Fee contracts between attorney and client are a subject of

special interest and concern to the courts. They are not to be enforced upon
the same basis as ordinary commercial contracts."
19. 294 So. 2d 512 (La. 1974).
20. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-106.

21. Masinter v. Grunewald, 309 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Sokol
v. Bob McKinnon Chevrolet, Inc., 307 So. 2d 404 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975);
James, Robinson, Felts & Starnes v. Powell, 303 So. 2d 229 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1974).

22. 309 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
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Sokol v. Bob McKinnon Chevrolet, Inc. 23 dealt with the
absence of proof in the record to sustain an award for attorneys' fees. The fourth circuit noted that the plaintiff did file
suit and completed the matter to judgment. It referred to
some of the considerations used in DR 2-106 to establish a
reasonable fee. While admitting that expert testimony on the
subject of attorneys' fees may be used as a guide, the court
concluded that expert testimony is not necessarily controlling, stressing the ability of the trial judge to estimate and
adjudge the value of an attorney's services.
The same conclusion was reached in James, Robinson,
Felts & Starnes v. Powell,24 in which the second circuit expressed the fixing of the fee as a duty of the trial judge when
the nature and extent of an attorney's services are borne out
by the record, even in the absence of expert testimony on the
subject. The conclusion is in accord with the rule that the
court may assess the value of fees for a lawyer when the
services are performed in the presence of the court. As long
as the fees awarded by the court are relatively nominal the
lack of expert testimony offers no risk. But what appears to
be a reasonable fee to one court might not strike another
judge the same way. Prudence would require proof by expert
testimony in doubtful cases.
An interesting facet of the James decision was the court's
statement that interest is due on legal fees from the date of
the statement rendered by the attorney after completion of
the work. The defendants had argued that interest was due
from the date of judgment. 25 The court's statement raises an
interesting question as to whether an attorney would be justified in printing on his bill-head a notice that interest at a
specified percentage is due on the amount charged from date
of the billing after completion of the case.
In Jefferson Bank & Trust Co. v. Post 26 the fourth circuit
decided whether a lending institution can keep an attorney's
fee collected under the terms of a mortgage note. The peculiar
facts of the case may have worked in favor of the attorney,
who had foreclosed the mortgage and purchased the property
at sheriffs sale for two-thirds of its appraised value in the
23. 307 So. 2d 404 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
24. 303 So. 2d 229 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
25. See Nugent v. Down, 230 So. 2d 597 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Hargrove
v. Blanchard, 216 So. 2d 127 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
26. 312 So. 2d 907 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
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name of his client. After holding the property for several
months, the plaintiff bank sold the property to one of its
original debtors for a price exactly equal to principal, interest, attorney's fees and costs. The same lawyer who handled
the matter for the bank in court handled the sale, and he
conveniently withheld the attorney's fee for his own account.
Once the bank became the owner of the property by purchase at the foreclosure sale, it could have fixed any price
which it desired for the sale of the property. The fact that the
ultimate price equaled the total indebtedness, inclusive of
attorney's fees at the rate of 25%, no doubt influenced the
court in its conclusion that the bank had indeed collected an
attorney's fee. Had the amount been the sum paid over to the
sheriff for payment to the attorneys of the fee stipulated in
the note, this would have been the proper disposition of this
case. It is less certain, however, that the attorneys would
have prevailed if less than the total judgment amount had
been the sales price to the purchaser after foreclosure.
Though the court did substantial justice in this case,
since the attorney's fees were used in the exact total as provided for in the note, the case will provide fuel for further
argument in the question of attorney's fees on foreclosures.

